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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (FRESNO)	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,) Case No. 1:22-CR-00103-JLT-SKO
Plaintiff,) **VIA ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE**
vs.) ^^VIA ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE^^
DENNIS FALASCHI,))
Defendant.	Monday, January 23, 2023 10:59 A.M.
	, 10.03 11.11.
TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION TO SEVER AND MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JENNIFER L. THURSON	
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
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APPEARANCES ON NEXT PAGE.

Electronic Court Recorder: Otilia Rosales

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Fresno, California, Monday - January 23, 2023, 10:59 a.m. PROCEEDINGS

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THE CLERK: The Court calls United States versus Dennis Falaschi, Case number 1:22-CR-103, scheduled for a motion to sever and a motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: All right. May I have the appearances beginning with the Government, please.

MR. BARTON: Good morning, Your Honor. Joe Barton for the Government.

THE COURT: For the defense?

MR. DAYS: Good morning, Your Honor. Marc Days appearing with Mr. Falaschi who's in my office behind my right shoulder.

THE COURT: All right. We're on calendar for the motion --

MR. DAYS: Your Honor, also appearing are Oliver Wanger and John Balazs for Mr. Falaschi.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

We're on calendar for the motion to sever as well as a motion to dismiss. I think the motion to sever is an easier issue. The Government doesn't oppose the severance. It's my understanding upon review of the indictment that those Counts 3 through 5 don't depend on any factual determination made as to Counts 1 and 2. It appears to me to make sense to sever them.

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4 1 Is there anything else that you wanted to add on that 2 topic, Mr. Days? 3 MR. DAYS: No, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Barton, any comments? 5 MR. BARTON: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. That motion is granted. 6 7 As to the motion to dismiss -- gosh, I'm sorry, this is 8 questions of law so I didn't make the CARES findings, the CARES Act findings, but I can do that. 9 10 Mr. Barton, do you wish for me to do that? 11 Your Honor, sure, we can adopt the MR. BARTON: 12 findings or the Government would be okay with adopting the 13 findings that you previously made in the other four cases. 14 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Days, I didn't ask this 15 previously. Obviously, your client is with you in your office. 16 He does have the right to an in-person appearance. Is he waiving 17 his right to in-person appearance for today's hearing and 18 proceeding by videoconference? 19 MR. DAYS: Yes, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: And, likewise, I have made these findings 21 earlier today. Do you wish for me to find them -- make these 2.2 findings again or adopt them? 2.3 MR. DAYS: Adoption's fine, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right. I will adopt the findings as I 25 previously made, and I will find based thereon that we can

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proceed by videoconference as provided by the CARES Act and this Court's general orders.

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As to the motion to dismiss then, Mr. Days, let me just tell you what I'm thinking here. When I look at your motion, it seems to assume that what has occurred here is seepage as opposed to leakage. I noticed that you have adopted a particular definition that you found in one dictionary. I have found just a quick search cases that define seepage and leakage as different.

You seem to be using those terms interchangeably. Do you agree that if there's a different definition for leakage as opposed to seepage that the section you've cited me to in all of the contracts don't really address, don't really support your motion?

And as I understand it, the couple of cases I found that were in the insurance context defines seepage as something different than leakage. Seepage as moisture going through a porous service and leakage being a breach of the service.

I noticed you didn't cite any case authority for the suggestion that any loss of water in this case equate to a seepage rather than a leakage, but that's -- what it seems to me that that is a question of law that can be determined. I don't know if you want me to determine that at this time. What are your comments in that regard?

MR. DAYS: Well, Your Honor, I believe that the cases that the Court -- well, first I'd point out that the Government

has made no argument that's juxtaposed by the Court. They've taken no position, at least in their opposition, on that issue.

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I believe that the cases that the Court cited, each one of them if I'm not mistaken has a definition set forth in the contract.

THE COURT: Actually, most of them -- there are several, and they seem to all rely upon different dictionaries. The only circuit court case that I found does not -- actually, none of the cases, the three that I looked at, rely upon any language in a contract.

And I would also point out it looks like the Government at Page 2 does take exception to the idea that this is a seepage because they say that your client didn't allow water to passively seep through but instead actively took advantage of a leak.

So, anyway, let me turn back to you.

MR. DAYS: Well, that seems to be an acknowledgment by the Government that I guess prior to there being a gate put on the -- as alleged in the indictment, prior to there being a new gate placed on a broken date, it would be seepage. They say that he didn't allow it to passively seep.

Our position is that, as set forth in our papers, whether you put a gate on the broken -- you replace the broken gate or not, it doesn't change the fact that the water at issue is seeping from the wall of the DMC into the stand pipe. And --

THE COURT: Doesn't that mean that an interpretation of

seepage as you have suggested it is any breach whatsoever is a seep? I mean my understanding of that term, I mean we can just all rely upon our understanding of that word and that word suggests, for example, when water flows through a canal, which is concrete, whatever water exits through the porous surface of the concrete belongs to the water district at no charge.

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But if there is a leak, for example, for whatever reason there's a huge crack in the canal and the canal leaks on to adjacent property, the standing water that can be retrieved would be called leakage. The water that is left on the ground that can't be recovered, wouldn't that be seepage? Isn't that the distinction?

MR. DAYS: Well, I suppose it depends on what the definition of seepage is.

THE COURT: And that's kind of where we started at.

MR. DAYS: Right. Right. I don't mean to go around with the Court, but Ballentine's Law Dictionary is a very respected legal dictionary that under that definition it seems very clear that this is seepage, water going through a hole, whether it be also water going through the ground or water going through the hole of a wall.

That is how Ballentine's, which is I think similar to Black's Law Dictionary but everybody can have their own opinion. But that seems to be very clear that this is seepage under the facts alleged in the indictment itself.

THE COURT: Did you also look at leakage in Ballentine's Law Dictionary?

MR. DAYS: I didn't see --

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THE COURT: I thought that was kind of striking that you didn't distinguish between seepage and leakage because you do seem to use those terms interchangeably. And when I look at the contract, it doesn't seem to suggest anything about a leak or any water leaking belongs to the water district. It talks only in terms of seepage and wastewater.

So that struck me as quite different. And when you look at the Eighth Circuit's case, the only circuit that I could find that actually defines this, says that there is an ordinary meaning to the word "seep" and that means to pass, flow, or ooze gradually through a porous substance. And they found that the ordinary meaning of the word "leak" means an unintended hole, a crack, or the like through which liquid, gas, light, or et cetera enters or escapes.

And they use the example that if you have a broken pipe with water coming out, you don't call that -- you know like in your house, if you have a broken pipe that fails or if a pipe that fails, you wouldn't call it a seep, you would call that a leak. And they talk about that just being within our ordinary understanding of the language.

And so it looks to me like your motion selects or construes the definition by Ballentine's of suggesting that leak

and seep mean the same.

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MR. DAYS: Well, our view is set out, Your Honor, that -- and, also, there's another issue about ambiguity. Our position is that seepage is defined in Ballentine's and it's consistent with what happened here. There's a hole in the wall and water went through, slow movement of water went through that hole and cracked the stand pipe.

THE COURT: The circumstances were a little bit different, though. Let's say that the crack, you know, rather than having the amount that was lost but instead it was catastrophic and you had, you know, I don't know, a thousand-acre feet going through per day, let's say. Would you still call that a seep or are you saying that whether it's a seep or a leak depends upon the volume of water that comes out?

MR. DAYS: Well, I think that that could be a factor, Your Honor, in making that determination.

THE COURT: So it's not how it exits, but it's the amount that exits. Is that your position?

MR. DAYS: Our position is the volume and how.

THE COURT: I have reviewed all the documents. Mr. Days, is there anything you wish to add to your argument at this time?

MR. DAYS: Yes, Your Honor.

I just want to point out that I'd like to address, I think we've already addressed our position regarding the water

being seepage and that that is a loss of water through the ground or a wall in a water delivery system. We think the indictment has set that out.

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It's our position that the contract authorized that, and the interpretation of a contract is for the Court subject to de novo review. Judge Wanger would like to make some comments about this being a legal issue for the Court to decide, so I would like to allow him that opportunity.

But I would like to point out, Your Honor, just in terms of seepage and its use being authorized, the contracts themselves authorize use for irrigation and for storage. So we're not talking about insignificant volumes of water contemplated in the contract. We're talking about volumes significant enough to be able to be captured, managed, and controlled for storage as well as for irrigation and reasonable and beneficial use.

So the contracts themselves contemplate the use of seepage in volumes. So I'd just like to point that out to the Court. And I believe Judge Wanger has some comments to make regarding this being a legal question for the Court to determine whether or not this is or isn't seepage.

THE COURT: Mr. Days, can I just clarify?

I mean I think we're on the same page that the indictment doesn't ever use the word "seep" or "seepage." It uses the word "leak" and "leakage." Right?

MR. DAYS: That is correct, Your Honor. The indictment does not use the word "seepage." It uses the word "leak." And we believe that based on the description given in the indictment that the facts alleged are describing what in fact is seepage, water going through a hole in the wall of the DMC. And there's a picture that --

THE COURT: Well, let me just stop you. Your definition doesn't say hole. Your definition is by slow movement through the ground or wall. It doesn't say through a hole, right?

MR. DAYS: Well, the actual -- you might be looking at my reply.

THE COURT: No, I'm looking at your motion at Document 22, Page 2, Lines 13 through 16.

MR. DAYS: One moment, Your Honor.

The loss of water from a water course or body of water natural or artificial by its slow movement through the ground or wall of the reservoir. Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. DAYS: Correct. And that's what we believe was described in the indictment.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Days.

Mr. Wanger, you had comments?

MR. DAYS: Judge, your volume is -- Judge Wanger, your volume is off.

12 1 THE COURT: Mr. Wanger, you're muted, sir. 2 (Pause) 3 THE COURT: Mr. Wanger, I don't know if you can hear me 4 but you're muted. I can't hear what you're saying. 5 MR. DAYS: You're muted. THE COURT: We can't hear you. 6 7 (Pause) 8 MR. WANGER: Can you hear me now? THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. 9 10 MR. WANGER: Oh, I'm sorry. I apologize. 11 All right. Let me start over. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 Just not to say that this is part of the MR. WANGER: 14 issue, but so that the evaluation here about this, the law is 15 that I had a requirement of over 20 years to determine the water law issue for Central Valley including this case, and relevant to 16 17 the issue of the matter of law here regarding this contract and 18 the contract that relates to the issue that has just been 19 discussed between you and the other indication, is O'Neill v. 20 United States, 50 F.3d 677. 21 As a matter of fact, that issue is that basically as a 2.2 matter of law, this is not something that the, if you will, the 23 jury decides. This is for the federal judge to make the decision 24 on that issue. And, in fact, no big deal but that case was my 25 case that was decided quite frankly by the Court of Appeals.

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So where we are is that there was no issue that was provided here to the grand jury relative to the issue of the seepage. The water that came through was seepage without a doubt. And, in fact, quite frankly, there was no issue whatsoever provided there and that is as a matter of law, quite frankly, a basic indication that there is from the standpoint of what was required either no knowledge or it was personal, basically intentionally eliminated and not provided because this water without a doubt was seepage and that was not to be required, it was not to be paid, and that was something that was known.

There is an additional issue here that again not a matter of facts but the difference here is that this issue, which is Dennis Falaschi, quite frankly, the whole decision and the whole, if you will, requirement in terms of how the water was ultimately received, was paid, was anything. There is an assertion in this case that this was the responsibility of Dennis. The fact is that is absolutely false. It is a lie.

What it was was this -- any law that came through here, and we do believe that it was seepage, quite frankly, came through and it was governed entirely by the water masters. That had nothing to do with Dennis. The water masters were governed by the, if you will, the provision that was discovered and that was basically taken care of by the head of this.

And they have actually paid millions of dollars. That

has been taken care of. And the bottom line is that ultimately as a matter of law, this individual was paid nothing about any of those pages. And so at any rate, that is something that I want to indicate because it is very important. The analysis here is quite -- there's so many indications that are just not accurate whatsoever.

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But in the final aspect of this, the basic requirement is that in the law, the contract was neither exculpatory nor exonerated because the issue of there was no requirement for payment until this law was something that was as a matter of law and that is not something that is decided is a matter of law for the Court to decide.

And, finally, what we see is that in the representation that was indicated and what the Court provided in the, if you will, the indication was that this requirement was the policy of the Department of Justice when a prosecutor conducted a grand-jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence. The evidence that was concerned about how this water came through and what this water was, was not provided whatsoever.

And the bottom line is that is essentially a complete problem. And in the final analysis, it is our belief that this motion is both accurate and should be granted. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Wanger.

Mr. Barton, do you have comments?

MR. BARTON: Yes, Your Honor. Just in brief.

The Government's view is that this motion is baseless. The Government wants to call the Court's attention to Footnote 4 in the defendant's own reply where they say that Mr. Falaschi does not argue that the indictment fails to state an offense on its face and also nor does the motion allege that the charges are not based on sufficient evidence.

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Those are the two questions before the Court of whether or not to sustain an indictment or sustain a motion. So they're saying that there is no issue, the indictment should be -- should stand and the motion to dismiss should be denied. Your Honor, it seems that they admit as much in their own motion by that footnote.

With that said, even if the Court were to entertain the motion further and even assuming that contract interpretation of seepage was correct and apply to this case versus leakage, the question is, is the water at issue seepage or was it stolen.

It's not the question of -- regardless of what the contract says and whether or not they were entitled to seepage, the question is at the site identified the diversion site on the Delta-Mendota Canal, did they steal it.

And as the indictment alleges, they had a device installed that you could turn the supposed seepage, you could turn it on and off. You can't turn seepage on and off. That's call it that. And that's what the indictment is alleging, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Wasn't the argument though, that Mr. Days is putting forward is everybody knew that this water district could not store water. So for them to take advantage of seepage, they had to be able to turn it on and off. I mean I think that's the nature of his argument in that regard. Is that right?

2.2

MR. BARTON: I don't know that I agree with that, Your Honor. I think they could -- in the Government's view, they would allege that they are taking advantage of if there's seepage, you know, they have some storage capacity. Whether or not they could store it all or put it to other uses, you know, that's an argument -- we could argue that I'm having to do that.

But I think in the Government's view, this water that there was -- they don't need to sort water if they take it and actively sell it for a windfall. And that's what the Government's allegation is that they were doing. They were taking this water and storing it for a windfall. So if it's seepage, you can't turn on and off seepage. You're going to -- and that's what they even allege they did. They had a whole device to turn it on and off and conceal it.

And then the Government would note, not that it's relevant to here in this case, but as far as the evidence in the case, as Mr. Falaschi and his lawyers know, there are over 80 undercover recordings of Mr. Falaschi admitting that he stole the water.

And with that, the Government submits.

THE COURT: All right. So at this point, though, what the evidence may be separate from the motion to dismiss, I have to evaluate that on its face.

2.2

Mr. Days, do you have any additional comments at this time?

MR. DAYS: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like to just respond to the seepage-leakage issue that we discussed earlier.

I'd just like to point out that it's my understanding that the cases that the Court's pointing out regarding insurance coverage, that in those contracts, in those cases, those contracts define the term leakage and seepage. And --

THE COURT: Again, as I said, I didn't tell you which cases I'm looking at. Maybe you're looking at different ones.

But one in particular, Eighth Circuit case, 2014, Syfco v.

Encompass Indemnity Corporation, 761 F.3d 867 at 872. 761 F.3d 867 at 872 refers to Random House Webster's Collegiate

Dictionary. It's not referring to a contract.

I also looked at McKain v. Safeco. It's a district court case out of Montana. That is 2022 WL 3655258 at 1 District of Montana August 25, 2022. It refers to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary from August 24th of 2022.

I also looked at <u>Klamath Water Users Protective</u>

<u>Association v. Patterson</u>. And -- I'm sorry, actually, that case is not one that I -- that was for a different issue.

But those two cases in particular are the ones that I

looked at that did not refer to contract terms but referred just like you do to a dictionary definition.

It does strike me, though, that in arguing this, there was an assumption seepage equals leakage. But, again, I didn't rely upon any contract. I have not relied upon any case that refers to a contractual term because I don't think that that helps us here. I'm looking at cases, and the Eighth Circuit case in particular, which just relies upon a different definition. And in those cases, they look at both what "seep" means and what "leak" means and contrast them.

So with that clarification, Mr. Days, did you have something else to say?

MR. DAYS: Yes, Your Honor.

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And I believe that when Mr. Wanger was addressing the Court earlier and he made the statement regarding the nature of these contracts, what he was saying was that the contracts are exculpatory and exonerating. That's --

THE COURT: Doesn't that -- but that presumes that this is seepage, doesn't it?

MR. DAYS: Yes. It's correct. And I think really what we're fleshing out here is our position is it's clear. But I think what the Court's fleshing out is if it's not favorable to us, it appears at the very least there's different legal definitions in that this is ambiguous which then raises questions.

THE COURT: I don't know that I'm saying that, Mr.

Days, because what it seems to me is the contract talks about seepage, it talks about wastewater. It doesn't mention leakage. And it seems like what you're saying is we -- the face of the contact I don't see as ambiguous.

I think in discussing it you have suggested an ambiguity that doesn't appear on the face because it doesn't attempt to discuss what a leak is. But I mean that's how I see it because the contract doesn't suggest -- because a leak could be so catastrophic, it could be so great. I think that it would be kind of obvious what would happen in that situation.

MR. DAYS: And this wasn't that --

THE COURT: It would try to fix the leak --

MR. DAYS: This wasn't --

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THE COURT: -- try to recover what --

MR. DAYS: I'm sorry. Pardon me, Judge.

THE COURT: No, go ahead. I was just going to say that they would try to -- they would fix the leak, they would try to recover whatever water had been lost. But -- and, you know, if a dam breaks, that's not seepage, right? I think we agree on that.

But I don't know why this is different because the allegation in the indictment and, of course, I don't know if that's true or not. What they're suggesting is a pipe, a drain that had been previously sealed with concrete failed and the water leaked. And they're saying that your client went in and

actively manipulated that drain in order to capture the water that was leaking in order to use and sell later on.

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And, again, that's a factual question that somebody will have to determine, but I'm having difficulty with your motion that just says that's what the allegations of the indictment are. We're calling that seepage. The contract says seepage is the property of the water district. But what I'm suggesting is there is a step missing in between.

MR. DAYS: Your Honor, I just want to make sure that -I have -- I think the indictment, at least as the allegations are
in the indictment, I'd want to make sure that it's clear the
Government's not claiming that there was a repair done on the
DMC. That's not the allegation.

THE COURT: No, I know. They're saying that not that it was repaired but that it was the device was put on in order to take advantage of the leak.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ DAYS: Well, not on the DMC. There's no allegation that $\operatorname{Mr.}$ --

THE COURT: Between the DMC and the standpipe.

MR. DAYS: The repair to prevent damage caused by the what we call seepage. There was a repair done on the standpipe which is depicted on Paragraph 13 is in the ditch in Konocti Water District's ditch. That is what was repaired according to the indictment.

There was nothing and a gate replaced because it was

damaged to be able to control to manage the seep as is contemplated by the contract. There's no allegation that anybody repaired or did anything to the DMC wall. That water was coming in on its own independent of --

THE COURT: We're on the same page on that, Mr. Days. That's not really the issue that I'm concerned with because I agree with you. If that had been repaired, additional concrete put in there, we wouldn't be talking about this because there would have been no water coming out.

So the question -- I mean the Government, as I understand the indictment, is suggesting, look, they discovered this situation, took some steps to make it so other people wouldn't discover it, and then took advantage of the leak. I mean that's in a nutshell what's being said. But I agree with you. I'm not suggesting that anyone, your client included, attempted to repair the leak that was -- or the water to stop the water from coming out of the canal.

MR. DAYS: Well, it's actually the opposite. It's that there was nothing done to cause water to leave the DMC. That water was --

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. DAYS: -- leaving the DMC on its own, no one took any steps to cause that to happen. And that water, like any seepage, is allowed to be controlled and managed to avoid damage. And that's what the indictment itself alleges.

Your Honor, the other thing is is that I know that Mr. Barton, the Government, brought up issues regarding Rule 12(b) and made the contention that this motion is basically moot based on Footnote 4. And Mr. Balazs, we'd like him to say just a few words in response to that argument if the Court believes that it should be addressed.

THE COURT: I'll let anyone say what they need to say.

Mr. Balazs, if you want to address that?

MR. BALAZS: Well, just that Footnote 4 does not in any way affect the basis of our motion. The basis of the motion is 12(b)(1) which it says that a court can consider any pretrial motion based, you know, before trial. 12(b)(3), failure to state an offense, the cases that the Government cites typically involve a specific element of the offense that the Government -- that the defense is alleging is missing or is invalid.

So we're not making that argument here. We're not making an argument failure to state an offense because the elements are missing. That's really the basis of the Footnote 4, and we're not basing a general challenge to the evidence the Government has presented.

It's a specific legal question on whether or not in our view the seepage from the canal into the standpipe, not even a leak but a seep from the canal to the standpipe is covered by the contract. And if it is, it's authorized and there's no (indiscernible).

THE COURT: And you agree, Mr. Balazs, though, if it is not seepage but in fact leakage, then we're basically where we are without the contract providing us any assistance at all?

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MR. BALAZS: So I would disagree there because my understanding is that the insurance contract case is even if they don't define the term "seepage" and "leakage" in the contract, most of those contracts involve both terms, "seepage" and "leakage" which suggests that they intended a difference between those two terms.

In this case, they only used the term "seepage." They did not use the term "leakage" which I think -- and it should be construed against the Government -- would mean that the term "seepage" is broader and would encompass both potentially leakage and seepage.

THE COURT: Doesn't that suggest -- I mean my head is spinning a little bit because just basically what I'm hearing you say is I should discount what I know to be a difference between these two words even though the contract's not saying that. The contract doesn't say, hey, any escape from the canal we're calling seepage.

And I'm supposed to ignore the difference in those terms, "seep" and "leak," and assume that any breach of the waterway equates to a seepage for purposes of the contract. I don't see that in the contact.

MR. BALAZS: Well, that's not in the contract. But

what the contract uses is a general term "seepage," which I think in this context refers to the quantity of water being released.

And the motion states --

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THE COURT: (Indiscernible) consider when the contract was originally -- and I'm guessing, but I don't know what the contract was originally developed. I don't know the nature of the canal, but my guess is it was dirt. And if you take a dirt canal and you put water through it, there will be seepage not caused by a breach of the wall but because water seeps into porous materials.

Then as years go by and these canals are converted to concrete, we also know concrete isn't glass. It is porous, and you lose water through the walls of the canal. And, again, we're not talking through a failure of the wall but because that is what naturally occurs.

And when you look at the contract, I mean even your motion specifically recognizes that it is water that naturally goes through the wall of the canal and, yet, it seemed to be making the argument that it is any sort of breach of the wall. I mean because it talks about slow movement through the ground or wall.

And yet, you're seeming to impose an understanding of this different than what common understanding of the words are. So I'm having a little difficulty with that.

MR. BALAZS: Well, I know Mr. Days knows the facts here

much better than I do. But I mean our main point is that the amount of water that was seeping was very small, one quarter of one percent. And this isn't a case where a dam is breaking in any sense. And I think that's encompassed --

2.2

THE COURT: But if there were a dam breaking, it sounds like what you would be saying is that's seepage.

MR. BALAZS: If a dam is breaking? Well, I think that's -- I wouldn't be saying that, and that's not at issue here. But I think --

THE COURT: So, again, then you agree with Mr. Days that whether it's a seep or a leak depends on the amount of water being lost as well as how it's being lost?

MR. BALAZS: I think that the quantity of the water is most important here.

THE COURT: Then how do we measure the quantity? Is it at the time, you know, per minute, per day, per year, per decade? How do we measure it then to determine whether it's a leak or a seep?

MR. BALAZS: Well, I think, you know, we've tried to do that in our motion and in our reply brief to kind of quantify what small quantity of water was actually seeping from the canal into the standpipe. And it's --

THE COURT: So if we're talking about a 130,000-acre feet, that's different than, you know, a drip per minute. But I'm just wondering, I mean if that's your argument that we have

to look at the volume lost and the contract doesn't talk about volume loss. It just talks about loss.

And, of course, to be accurate, it doesn't define seepage. You're relying on a particular dictionary you prefer. There are other dictionaries that define it in a way that isn't consistent with that.

But if you're saying that we do have to look at the amount of water lost, where in the contract does it tell us that we do that or how that is to be done? Is it per minute, per day, per hour, per week, per month? And when we look at 130,000-acre feet lost, are you telling me that's seepage?

MR. DAYS: Over 20 --

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MR. BALAZS: Over 20 -- yeah, over --

THE COURT: Then you're saying you have to look at what decades long or you have to look at a minute. And I don't know where you're getting that. That's the trouble with what you're asking me to do.

MR. BALAZS: Go ahead, Marc.

MR. DAYS: Doesn't that go towards the ambiguity of the term? How is anybody going to make that determination when you're deciding whether or not to use seepage that can be used in volumes to irrigate and to store and to use for beneficial and reasonable use?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DAYS: Who knows --

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THE COURT: What I'm going to do at this point, if we have anything -- I mean we're going around in circles. What I'm going to do is give you an opportunity, if you like, to file a brief specifically on the issue of seepage versus leakage or not. You don't have to, but if you would like to, because I've seen some cases, I've seen some courts that define those terms. So I don't want to be Alice in Wonderland here seeing words that seem obvious to me and being asked to impose a different meaning on those words.

If you'd like to do that, how much time would you need?
Mr. Days?

MR. DAYS: How much time do we need, Mr. Balazs?

MR. BALAZS: I would ask for two weeks. I have a capital case I have to be out of town for for a couple of days this week.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Barton, are you intending to file a brief, as well? I don't think they have to be cross -- I mean I think they could be cross briefs. I don't think we need to have reply on this.

MR. BARTON: Your Honor, I'd like to reserve the right. So if they take two weeks, I'd like an additional two weeks to file whatever opposition that we think may be necessary.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm limiting -- I just want to know what these words mean and why your definition that you've chosen makes more sense than what some of the other courts have

adopted. And I want not just to talk to me about seepage. I want you to talk to me about what leakage is because, clearly, the English language just has a distinction between those terms.

And if you're saying, fine, okay, you know what, I agree that there is -- that it's maybe not a seep and you want to talk about how that's ambiguous, I think you've already done that, don't you think, Mr. Balazs?

MR. BALAZS: Yes.

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THE COURT: All right. So then I really just want to know what is the definition of these terms and I expect that you all will do a much more comprehensive review of the case authority than -- I mean I just took about a half an hour and I came up with several cases where courts have defined these terms.

And what I'll do then is I'll say -- and with that context, Mr. Barton, do you feel like you need to reply or can you just do your independent research on the topic and also have a brief within two weeks?

MR. BARTON: I can do my independent research and have a brief within two -- I'd reserve the right to reply, though, because I don't know exactly what they're going to argue, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So then let's do this. We'll have everybody file their briefs if they choose by February 6 and any reply to your opponent's brief by February 21. Does that work?

29 1 MR. BALAZS: Yes, Your Honor. MR. DAYS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. 2 3 THE COURT: All right. 4 MR. BARTON: Yes, Your Honor. That works for the 5 Government. 6 THE COURT: Anything else at this time for this motion? 7 MR. DAYS: I don't believe so. 8 THE COURT: Mr. Barton, anything else? MR. BARTON: No, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: All right, then. Thank you, counsel. 10 11 MR. DAYS: Thank you, Your Honor. (Proceedings adjourned at 11:40 a.m.) 12 13 ---000---14 15 16 <u>CERTIFICATE</u> 17 I, DIPTI PATEL, court-approved transcriber, certify that the 18 foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic 19 sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 20 Dipti Patel 21 22 23 DIPTI PATEL, CET-997 24 LIBERTY TRANSCRIPTS Date: January 24, 2023 25